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THE GREEK CONSTITUTION FROM 
A POLITICAL SCIENCE POINT OF VIEW 
George Tsebelis* 
In almost all my professional life I have been working on the analysis of 
institutions on the basis of one concept, which constitutes the basis of the 
development of economics and is becoming more and more prominent 
in political science: the concept of (Nash) equilibrium. Equilibrium is 
an outcome that maximizes the utilities of all the actors involved. In 
different terms, it is the result of optimal action of every player, given the 
prevailing institutions, and the behavior of all the other actors involved. 
Why is equilibrium analysis so crucial in the social sciences? Because, 
assuming the actors have preferences, and they are rational, each one of 
them will do the best he or she can to achieve these preferences, or reach 
as close to them as possible given the rules of the game and the behavior 
of other players. In other words, equilibrium outcomes will be reached by 
the rational action of all players involved, and once reached they will not 
be changed by the action of individual players alone (because each one 
of them has already adopted optimal behavior to reach the equilibrium 
point, so, unilateral departure does not promote his goals). 
In politics, an important way to "lock" such equilibrium outcomes is 
to make the change of the status quo more difficult, to require qualified 
majorities of one (collective) actor or concurrent majorities of different 
players (in the case, say, of a coalition) to achieve. This has been the sub­
ject matter of work presented in my book Veto Players. 
A veto player is an actor whose agreement is necessary to change 
the status quo. And, every political system has a certain number of veto 
* George Tsebelis is Anatol Rapoport Collegiate Professor of Political Science at 
the University of Michigan. This article is the speech he delivered at the University of 
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players. For example, in the United States there are three institutional 
veto players, the President, the House, and the Senate, and all three are 
required to agree in order to modify the status quo. In contrast Greece 
three years ago, had a single veto player, the majority party and its prime 
minister. Within the last two years, the number of veto players changed, 
from three (the three partners in government) and to two (the current 
two party government). The overall number of veto players varies by is­
sue. In the United States the President is the only veto player in terms of 
foreign and defense policy, in Greece the number of veto players expands 
when we deal with the election of the President of the Republic (this is 
why the main opposition party can decide an election is it so desires). 
I first demonstrate the intuition behind Veto Players analysis, and then 
apply it to the Greek context. In veto players analysis, I relate propos­
als for change to existing policies, the status quo, and compare how the 
placement and distribution of actors' preferences among veto players de­
termines which outcomes are possible. Let us assume a plane (a two di­
mensional policy space) and locate the status quo at the point SQ. Next, 
let us assume that there is a single veto player located in point A (say a 
government of PASOK or New Democracy in the 80's or 90's). This veto 
player prefers anything inside the circle with center A that goes through 
SQ over SQ itself as these polices would be closer to A's preferences than 
the current SQ. Player A prefers the SQ to all points outside this circle. 
The shaded area in the Figure 1 is "the winset of the status quo" with 
one veto player. Let us now add a second veto player Β (like the current 
two party government). Similarly, Player Β prefers anything that is lo­
cated inside the circle with center Β going through SQ. For this two veto 
player situation (a coalition government) the winset of the status quo is 
the hatched area in the Figure. Adding a second veto player significantly 
reduces the winset of the status quo. Let us now add a third veto player C 
(say, a three party coalition). Draw again a circle around C going through 
SQ. Now the winset of SQ is the empty set, as there are no policies that 
the three veto players prefer to the current status quo. The system is 
locked, and as long as these three parties remain in government, the sta­
tus quo cannot be replaced. This is what happened with the ERT policy. 
The general idea generated by this analysis, is that the more veto players, 
the more policy stability, that is, the greater the difficulty in changing 
the status quo. 
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Figure 1 
Winset of one, two, 
and three veto players 
Winset A 
Winset (AB) 
A second idea I want to impress upon you is that the larger the ideo­
logical distances between veto players, the more difficult it is to change 
the status quo. In Figure 2,1 present two different countries: A contains 3 
veto players with large ideological distances among them, and Β contains 
five veto players and smaller ideological distances among them. As you 
can see, the winset is smaller (and thus policy stability is higher) in coun­
try A than in country Β despite the higher number of veto players in B. 
Figure 2 
Veto players A1-A3 produce more policy stability than B1-B5 
(no matter where the status quo is) 
Al 
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The conclusions I will draw from these figures are that if we want to 
promote change, we should reduce both the number of veto players and 
the ideological distances among them. If we care about policy stability 
and want to preserve the status quo, we should do the opposite. Politi-
cally, there are many ways to preserve stability: increase required majori-
ties (2/3 or 3/5 instead of absolute majority, or plurality), or endow two 
different institutions with veto powers (instead of one or two different 
parties), or add requirements for a referendum for ratification, etc. 
Whether we want to change the status quo or not is a political deci-
sion that depends on our preferences as well as the status quo. However, 
historically conservatives have wanted to preserve the status quo while 
the left wanted change. Professionally, political scientists want the po-
litical system to be able to respond to changes in the environment with 
policy changes, while economists prefer to leave things to private actors 
without government interference. 
The basic assumption of the rest of my talk is the following: Greek so-
ciety is in an unsustainable equilibrium, and we desperately need change 
in the short and medium run. It may seem obvious, but let me elaborate. 
We can see the "equilibrium" part of the argument in everyday behaviors 
of avoiding taxes or receipt collection because this is the easiest way for 
many companies to stay in business, or avoid the overwhelming burden 
of taxation. We can see "equilibrium" signs in the price of milk or the 
protection of taxi drivers. We can see it in laws that are postponed wait-
ing for implementing measures. We can see it in laws that are modified 
before they get implemented, so that nobody knows what the law is, and 
the status quo remains the same. 
We can see the "short run" need for change from the behavior of our 
lenders, who are asking for structural reforms before they release the 
next payment. And we can anticipate further pressures form the slow rate 
of release of funds. "But," the opposing argument may be, "if we imple-
ment the government multi-law we are done. Aren't we?" 
The answer to that is that even if we did, there are long term problems 
of sustainability of the debt (I hope that some of them will be relieved in 
the near future), but more importantly, there are problems of sustainabil-
ity with intergenerational pension transfers, not just in Greece, but in all 
advanced industrialized societies that have not been discussed and will 
be requiring answers. Because of the arrival of baby boomers at the stage 
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of retirement, social security transfers cannot be sustained at current lev-
els not only in Greece but also in any country. Because of the progress 
of medicine and the ability to sustain human life in advanced age with 
astronomical costs, current healthcare agreements are not sustainable ei-
ther. A democratic debate on these issues and the design of sustainable 
solutions are necessary and a political system that can address and im-
plement these changes is necessary. In this respect, the crisis makes the 
problem in Greece more obvious and more urgent, but other countries 
will have to take down the road similar steps. 
Therefore, our institutions should enable change instead of prevent-
ing it. In other words, in a systematic way, we should enable Greece to 
change by reducing the number of veto players, and/or their ideologi-
cal distances. Designing the institutions to permit change is a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient one. After all, we had a single veto player 
from 1974 until 2012 (not to mention 1967-74 or even before) and we 
did not avoid the crisis. 
In what follows, I will use the veto players framework to address 
three different issues: 1. Constitutions in a comparative perspective. 2. 
Issues debated related to the Greek Constitutional reform. 3. Electoral 
system. In all three cases, the framework will be the one I developed in 
Veto Players and summarized before. 
1. A LONG CONSTITUTION IS A (POSITIVELY) BAD CONSTITUTION1. 
Constitutions are "locked" documents because they are the stable 
basis of all legislation in a country. They require qualified majorities 
to be modified. The Greek constitution specifies that "two separate 
parliamentary votes on either side of a general election and a majority 
of three-fifths of the total number of seats in at least one of the votes" is 
required for all changes.2. This 29-word summary of Article 110 of the 
1. This part is a summary of G. Tsebelis - D. Nardi Jr., "A Long Constitution is a 
(Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries", British Journal of Politi-
cal Science, forthcoming. For a detailed analysis see the original. 
2. P. Eleftheriadis - N. Alivizatos. "The Greek Constitutional Amendment of 
2001", South European Society and Politics, no 7, 2002, p. 64. 
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Greek constitution condenses the article from the original six paragraphs 
and uses 255 words! In other words, it is almost 10 times as long. We will 
return to this point in a while. 
Constitutions can be "locked" in different ways: qualified majorities 
of a parliament may be required; agreement of multiple chambers may be 
required; référendums may impose additional requirements at the end of 
the process; and/or certain articles may not be amendable (usually human 
rights). We will examine the impact of these "locking" devices in a while, 
but for the time being, we could form an expectation, that the more locked 
a constitution, the more difficult it is to be modified, and the fewer amend-
ments it will have over the years. This is an equilibrium statement, because 
what is the reason for locking a constitution, if not to prevent modifica-
tions, and if these locking devices work, we should not be seeing many 
amendments. In other words, the expectation should be a negative rela-
tionship between the existence of "locking" provisions and amendments. 
Figure 3. 
; Locking ("rigidity") and frequency of amendments in OECD countries 
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Figure 3, presents the actual relationship between locking ("rigidity") 
and frequency of amendments in OECD countries. We selected these coun­
tries because chances are their constitutions will be documents respected 
and enforced, while in third world countries constitutions may not be 
either, and information about such documents would not reflect what 
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is happening in the country. The data I am presenting here come from 
the Comparative Constitutions Project3 included in the Google dataset 
"Constitute".4 The slope of this relationship between difficulty of modifi­
cation and actual amendments not only is not negative (as we expected) 
but if anything it is positive. This is the first puzzle that we will explore. 
Statistical analysis enables us to "control for" additional variables, 
that is, if we consider other variables that may affect both "locking" and 
frequency of amendments, we can take their impact out of the relation­
ship and reexamine the graph. The expectation would, as before, is a 
negative slope; countries that have locked their constitution (controlling 
for any variable) should have fewer amendments (controlling for the 
same variable). 
Figure 4. 
Locking and frequency of amendments, controlling for the length 
(logged) of the corresponding constitution 
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Figure 4, presents the same relationship of locking and frequency of 
amendments, controlling for the length (logged) of the corresponding 
constitution5. The relationship is even more pronounced and in the wrong 
3. Z. Elkins - T. Ginsburg - J. Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2009. 
4. https://www.constituteproject.org 
5. We log (use the logarithm instead of the natural number) because the effect 
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direction. This is the second and more important puzzle we will try to 
explain. Here is what Figure 4 suggests: the longer a constitution the 
more "locked" it is, that is, the more difficult it is to be amended. Yet, 
the longer constitutions also undergo the most frequent revisions, and do 
so despite the fact that they are more locked. Why would the longer and 
more locked constitutions be the more inadequate ("bad" as the title of 
this section calls them)? 
Let us start our investigation by trying to understand what "length" of 
a constitution reflects. It can reflect the number of topics included in a 
constitution, it can reflect the complexity of organization of the state (a 
federal government may require more articles of the constitution in order 
to regulate the interactions between the different levels of government, 
or it could delegate more decisions to states and their constitutions like 
the US constitution that delegates all the powers not enumerated in the 
document itself to the states), and it can reflect the details or restrictions 
imposed by the constitution on each subject. Generally, constitutions in-
clude more topics the more recent they are, so, a good proxy for the num-
ber of subjects included in a constitution is the age of the original docu-
ment. A preliminary investigation indicates that the most relevant vari-
able associated with constitutional length is the average number of words 
of devoted to each topic, that is, the number of "details" or "restrictions". 
Although we know that the length of a constitution is essentially an 
aggregate of the "detail" included in each of the covered issues, we do not 
know the reason, or content of this length. Constitutions can include three 
different kinds of provisions. First, constitutional provisions can regulate 
technical or innocuous matters that do not impact political behavior (such 
as descriptions of the national flag). Second, constitutions can contain 
aspirational goals, such as the right to work (included in many post World 
War II constitutions), which do not impose any specific obligations on the 
government, and consequently are not enforceable in court (not surpris-
ingly, none of these countries has completely abolished unemployment). 
Third, constitutions contain restrictive or prescriptive statements. Most 
constitutions contain sections detailing government structure and the 
rights of citizens. For example, the U.S. president cannot circumvent the 
of length is not constant over time: the first 1000 words of a constitution are more 
significant than the tenth. 
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constitutional requirement that he seek the "advice and consent" of the 
Senate for presidential appointments. While these three categories of pro-
visions maybe straightforward at the theoretical level, there is no direct 
way of distinguishing between constitutions that contain many substan-
tive restrictions as opposed to those that are simply garrulous.6 We will try 
to make inferences about the relative importance of each part. 
Constitutions are typically amended after extraordinary procedures. 
These high hurdles of approval and modification guarantee that the con-
stitution at the moment of adoption or modification is located in the 
"constitutional core" of a country. The "core" of a political system is a 
technical term referring to the set of points that cannot be upset by some 
specified majoritarian procedure. So, the "constitutional core" means the 
document that cannot be replaced by any other under the existing re-
quirements for constitutional revision. 
Let us consider a body that decides by qualified majority rule in one 
dimension (like a parliament with a single chamber). 7 In Figure 5, I 
present a seven-member body that decides by a qualified majority of 5/7 
or 6/7. The reader can verify that when the qualified majority increases 
from 5 to 6 members, _ _ 
the core expands (from Figure 5 
the 3-5 segment to the | Unicameral Core with 5/7 
2-6 segment). and 6/7 Majorities 
Tsebelis and Nard8 
argue that a constitution 
will be located inside the 
core of the political sys-
tem. Indeed, any propos-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I—IH 1 1 1 1 
5/7 Core 
6/7 Core 
6. S. Voigt, "Explaining constitutional garrulity." International Review of Law 
and Economics, no 29, 2009, pp. 290-303. 
7. The interested reader can consult X.Yataganas - G. Tsebelis, "The Treaty of 
Nice, the convention draft and the constitution for Europe under a veto players 
analysis", European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 1, no 3, 2005, pp. 429-451 in 
order to see what the core of multiple chambers in two dimensions looks like. It is 
sufficient here to argue that it "expands" as the number of chambers and the qualified 
majorities in each one of them increases. 
8. G. Tsebelis - D. Nardi Jr., "A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: 
Evidence from OECD Countries", op.cit. 
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Figure 6 
Change of core in one dimension 
under 5/7 and 6/7 majority 
Possible 
modification 
under 5/7 
New 5/7 Core 
Old 5/7 Core 
2 3 
+++ 
2 3' 
I I I I—IH—h-r 
Old 6/7 Core 
NO Possible 
modification 
under 6/7 New 6/7 Core 
al outside the core 
would be defeated 
by a point inside the 
core. As for consti-
tutional revisions, 
they argue that the 
only way they be-
come an option is 
because a point that 
was inside this core 
is now located out-
side. In other words, 
a constitutional revi-
sion can involve only 
points (and provisions) that used to be centrally located inside the body 
politic of a country but ceased to occupy such a location, and the new core 
does not include them anymore. 
This change can occur only under a significant modification of the 
positions of the individual players (or exogenous shocks that make the 
previous positions no longer tenable). Figure 5 presents such a modifica-
tion in one dimension to make things clear. The underlying assumption is 
that a qualified majority in one only chamber is required for the revision. 
In the example, out of the 7 members, 5 have shifted and moved 
(some of them significantly to the right). In particular, players 1 and 2 
remained in place, while player 3 moved slightly to the right (from 3 
to 3'), player 4 moved by a substantial amount (to position 4' which is 
leapfrogging the old player 5), and players 5, 6, and 7 in their new posi-
tions (5', 6' and 7') moved outside the whole political space of the past 
(beyond point 7 of the figure). This is a political change so radical that it 
is difficult to imagine in any real polity outside a revolution. Yet, the 5/7 
core was only slightly modified: player 3 has moved outside the core and 
player 7 is now within the core. More to the point, it is only if the consti-
tution involved a provision in the (3,3') area that there are grounds for a 
constitutional revision if the required constitutional revision majority is 
5/7. On the other hand, if the required majority for constitutional revi-
sion is 6/7, then there is no possibility for such a modification (despite 
the significant shift of the public opinion). Then voter 2 will preserve the 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 01:57:12 |
THE GREEK CONSTITUTION FROM A POLITICAL SCIENCE POINT OF VIEW 155 
constitution by voting down the amendment. From the above discussion 
follows that a constitutional change requires a point of the previous con-
stitutional core (an article or a section of the existing constitution) to be 
located outside the current constitutional core of the polity. 
On the basis of the above analysis, given the large size and the central 
location of these constitutional cores, it is very likely that the two cores 
(at time t and t+1) will overlap. Points in the intersection of the two cores 
cannot be subject of constitutional revisions (by the definition of "core"). 
The only provisions that could be changed are the ones that belong in 
the core at time t but not in the core at time t+1,as illustrated in with 
player 3 in Figure 6. Unlike simple legislation that (usually) requires a 
simple majority in parliament, and can be changed by a different majority 
(left succeeding right or vice versa), the required constitutional majori-
ties include parts of the previous majorities. Consequently, constitutional 
revision requires a massive change in the opinions of the political actors. 
What are the implications of this analysis? Constitutional revisions 
can occur either because the preferences of political forces changed (in 
other words, they recognize that they had made a mistake in the original 
draft) or because external conditions changed significantly such that new 
provisions are considered necessary (for example, an economic crisis). 
But why should all these difficulties of locking and unlocking be associ-
ated with long constitutions? Figure 4. above provides the answer that 
length is not an innocuous variable associated just with the number of 
words. It is a summary indicator of the level of restrictive provisions asso-
ciated with each item included in the constitution. And it is these restric-
tions that enter into conflict with an evolving reality which generate the 
need for change (despite the difficulties of unlocking the constitution). 
The focus of constitutional revisions is on prescriptive or prescriptive 
provisions, not on hortatory or aspirational statements. The very attempt 
to amend the constitution indicates that the existing constitution had (in 
the opinion of overwhelming majorities in the country) serious shortcom-
ings, and these shortcomings were experienced and understood as such. 
This is a fundamental point of the analysis. The frequency of revisions 
indicates that the constitutions are not just garrulous, but also impose 
objective, negative costs on society. Tsebelis and Nardi9 connect lengthy 
9. G. Tsebelis - D. Nardi Jr., "A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: 
Evidence from OECD Countries", op.cit. 
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constitutions with low GDP per capita, and corruption. Here I will pre­
sent only the last Table of their findings: 
Table 1 : GDP per capita Regressed on Constitutional Restrictions (Detail) 
and Corruption 
Detail 
# Amendments 
Under Democracy 
Education 
(% labor force) 
Natural Resources 
(% GDP) 
Trade Openness 
(% GDP) 
Investment (% 
GDP) 
Savings 
(% GDP) 
Corruption 
(WGI) 
Corruption 
(CPI) 
Government 
Consumption 
(1) 
-0.959** 
(0.28) 
0.006** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.119*** 
(0.02) 
(2) 
-0.817** 
(0.26) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.010* 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
0.008* 
(0.00) 
-0.103*** 
(0.02) 
(3) 
-0.917** 
(0.29) 
0.006** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.00) 
-0.046*** 
(0.01) 
(4) 
-0.795** 
(0.26) 
0.005** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.011* 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
0.008 
(0.00) 
-0.040*** 
(0.01) 
(5) 
-1.457** 
(0.41) 
0.009** 
(0.00) 
-0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.007 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
(6) 
-0.961* 
(0.45) 
0.007** 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-0.012* 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
0.014* 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
r
 4.400*** 4.323*** 4.202*** 4.161*** 4.761*** 4.270*1 
Lonstant
 ( Q D ) ( Q J ( ) ) ( Q 1 5 ) ( ( m ) ( Q 3 4 ) ( Q 2 7 ) 
R 2 0.7518 0.7953 0.7443 0.7824 0.5155 0.6171 
Ν 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is average GDP per capita PPP over 2006-11. 
Independent variables are averaged over 2000-06. Sources: WDI, WGI and TI. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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According to Table 1 the variable "detail" has a big negative impact 
on GDP per capita despite most of the controls of ecomnomic literature 
(education, natural ressources, trade openness, investment, savings) as 
well as corruption. But our analysis about constitutional rigidity and 
amendments indicates that "detail" is de fact an indicator for restrictions. 
In conclusion, long constitutions are bad constitutions because they 
are too restrictive (as indicated by the length of their provisions). They 
impose burdens on the countries that they are supposed to regulate. 
These populations succeed frequently in modifying the constitutions (we 
have no measure of how many times they tried and failed because of the 
effectiveness of the restrictions included in the constitution itself. This is 
a subject that we will develop in the next section. 
2. BARKING UP THE WRONG TREE 
From the previous analysis follows that if there is something wrong 
with the Greek Constitution is that it is too restrictive, too long, and too 
locked. I do not have an exhaustive list of excessive restrictions. I have 
argued that the inclusion of the definition of "forest" is an excess, I have 
argued that the principle of proportionality should not be included, not 
because it should be replaced, but it should not enshrined and give to 
activist judges a free pass to get involved in every subject. The European 
Union has forced us to ignore article 14 about the major shareholder. In a 
comparative perspective, there are constitutions that speak about 'conflict 
of interest" and define what should be done in order to be avoided (like 
turn over stock to some managing firm) but no other constitution in the 
world goes into such detailed restrictions. 
Here I will talk just about one example that I know for professional 
reasons. Article 16 of the Greek Constitution precludes the existence of 
private universities. Greece is the only OECD country with such a constitu-
tional restriction. Elimination of this article was aborted in the previous 
round of revisions. There are two issues concerning article 16. The first 
one is: should we permit private education at the university level or not? 
The second, whatever our decision, should we eternalize it by including it 
in the constitution? The answer to the second is an emphatic NO. We are 
not the smartest OECD country in the world to have this restriction while 
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the others do not. I would also argue that even a legal (as opposed to 
constitutional) prohibition is seriously misplaced because if higher edu­
cation is a lever in the progress of a country restricting the institutions 
that provide it, and therefore restricting competition among them is a 
fundamentally wrong. The idea that private education is supporting the 
rich (in the Greek context) is fundamentally misguided because rich kids 
will get their education outside Greece and it is good students without 
enough means who will be deprived of it, while the very existence of pri­
vate institutions would enable them to have a better education. Although 
I have been in public institutions most of my life in the US, I have to tell 
you not only that the best institutions in the US are private, but also that 
these private institutions are redistributing income through scholarships 
for the financially deserving students they admit. 
How about the constitution's length of 27000 words? Panagiotis 
Tsyalas and Stavros Tsakyrakis (Athens University) make a proposal that 
reduces the words of the 25 first articles of the 1975 constitution from 
5236 to 2263 (reduction by 57%).10 This operation involved the elimina­
tion of ambiguous terms («χρηστά ήθη»); duplications (article 5A on right 
to be informed); elimination of articles that in their judgment (and mine) 
have no place in a constitution like religion. Their main argument is that 
the Greek constitution is garrulous, it involves minor issues that should 
not be included in a constitution, and therefore their first priority was to 
eliminate them.11 
However, the public debate, instead of focusing on these issues, is 
trying to modify specific articles about the organization of powers on the 
basis that since a crisis of monumental proportions was manifested in the 
Greek society, it must be the fault of institutions. The people who pro­
pose institutional modification propose a series of measures that essen­
tially increase the number of veto players. As we observed above, the nec­
essary (but unfortunately by no means sufficient) condition for change 
is reducing the number of veto players, and the reduction of the distance 
10. S. Tsakyrakis, «Άσκηση αναθεώρησης του Συντάγματος», September 17, 2013. 
http://tsakyrakis.wordpress. com/2013/09/17/ 
11. «Πράγματι, οι μακροσκελείς διατυπώσεις και οι (από συνταγματικής άποψης) 
ασήμαντες διατάξεις κυριαρχούν στο σώμα του ισχύοντος συνταγματικού κειμένου, ώστε 
ως πρώτη μας προτεραιότητα θεωρήσαμε την απάλειψη τους». 
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among them (if possible). This is why I claim that these modifications are 
barking up the wrong tree. What are these wrong-headed ideas? Popular 
election and increase of the powers of the President; creation of a new 
Senate; elections in fixed intervals (4 years); référendums; proportional 
electoral system in the constitution. I take these ideas one at a time: 
President. While the popular election of the President seems in the 
eyes of its proponents to be a "democratic" idea asking the people to 
decide, what is overlooked is that any nominal authority of the President 
included in the constitution becomes his proper right, since he is a di-
rectly elected representative of the people. This is what happened with 
the constitutional amendment in the French Vth Republic. For example 
he may or may not issue Presidential decrees to promulgate laws. In this 
sense a new veto player may be included in the political game.12 On the 
other hand, if the powers of the president revert to the original provisions 
of the 1975 constitution, it is not a serious revision (and not worth fight-
ing over). The election of a president is currently the only way that the 
opposition party can become a veto player, because if a person nominated 
for president does not receive 3/5 of the votes, there is a new election. I 
suggest a different way of electing the president that will reduce the ex-
ternalities of the 3/5 threshold, and will lead to the selection of a widely 
accepted individual. Each party proposes one candidate, and the members 
of parliament have the right to select up to three candidates using a secret 
ballot. The person with the most votes (provided he or she has more than 
3/5) wins. A president elected with this procedure will have the respect 
of the Parliament, and the electorate, and will be able to carry out extend-
ed authorities to appoint candidates above party conflicts for important 
positions either as the primary officer, or as the default solution in case of 
failure of existing mechanisms to fulfill their duties in a reasonable time 
frame, say 3 months (judiciary, independent organization presidents etc.). 
Senate. It is not clear whether people who propose this idea want 
a second legislative body, or simply an institution that will be "above" 
12. For a detailed discussion of legislative powers of Presidents in different coun-
tries see G. Tsebelis - E. Aleman, "Presidential Conditional Agenda Setting in Latin 
America", World Politics, vol. 57, no 3, 2006, pp. 396-420 and G. Tsebelis - T.P. 
Rizova, "Presidential conditional agenda setting in the former Communist coun-
tries", Comparative Political Studies, vol. 40, no 10, 2007, pp. 1155-1182. 
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parties and make proposals for important independent agencies. In the 
first case, it will be an additional veto player which will delay or abort 
legislation, in the second, such authority could be very well be offered to 
the president, particularly if elected by the procedure I just proposed.13. 
Elections in fixed intervals. While the people that propose this idea are 
tired of the constant electoral climate prevailing in the country they are 
proposing a cure far worse than the disease. If the government fails in 
a vote of confidence, or the opposition succeeds in a censure vote, this 
indicates that the agreement that generated the government has expired, 
and the people should decide about what is to be done. While this is 
obvious, what is not very well understood by the proponents of fixed 
election intervals is that the threat of dissolution (existing in the hands 
of the prime minister) is the major reason for the existence of party 
discipline in parliamentary systems.14 Indeed, without this threat, the 
different MPs would vote on every issue according to their preferences, 
and the government would not be able to have a program, or pass legis-
lation that it considers necessary. Similar situations existed in the Wei-
mar Republic, and at the end of the French IV Republic with destructive 
consequences. A thought experiment would persuade the reader that no 
legislation would have been possible without party discipline in Greece 
the last two years. 
Referendums. The institution already exists, thanks to the Papandreou 
government, and therefore is not necessary to be enshrined in the Consti-
tution. Proponents of référendums argue (correctly) that referendum out-
comes are closer to the preferences of the public than solutions adopted 
by the political system. One thing that is not understood is that the most 
important question about référendums is who controls the agenda. Actu-
ally, in most countries the question is divided in two components: who 
asks the question, and who "triggers" the referendum. These distinctions 
generate four different types of référendums (a required referendum, a 
veto player referendum, a popular veto referendum, and a popular ini-
13. G. Tsebelis - J. Money, Bicameralism, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 1997. 
14. D. Diermeier - T.J. Feddersen, "Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of 
Confidence Procedure", The Amencan Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 3, 1998, 
pp. 611-621. 
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tiative referendum).15. Roughly speaking, each step in this process in-
creases the democratic credentials of a referendum, but even in the last 
one (popular initiative) what is not taken into account is the collateral 
consequence of a referendum. For example, think what would happen if 
we had a referendum by popular initiative if we want to increase taxes, 
or cancel the memorandum, and what would be the consequences. Before 
you answer the hypothetical, think of the faith of Papandreou after he 
proclaimed the referendum. 
Pure proportional representation in the constitution. This would be the 
worst proposal of all, both in terms of its goal (pure proportional repre-
sentation), and in terms of the means used (eternalize the system). I will 
discuss it more in detail in the third part of this talk. 
The Greek Constitution is locked, and requires 3/5 majority to be 
modified. Consequently, none of the above-discussed measures is re-
motely feasible under the current conditions. The only feasible amend-
ments are the ones that achieve almost unanimity of the existing actors, 
like ministerial responsibility (art 86), parliamentary immunity (art 62), 
independent authorities (art 101 A), principle shareholder (art 14). This 
is the suggestion of legal experts like Alivizatos and Pararas.16 Even with 
these restricted goals, we run the risk of a restrictive interpretation of 
Article 110, which specifies that a period of five years must pass before 
any other amendment is undertaken (Pararas suggests a non-restrictive 
interpretation of this article to permit amendments in areas that have not 
been already amended within the period). 
It would be highly desirable to reduce the number of MPs to 200. 
Luckily, this does not require a constitutional amendment. It does require 
significant political courage, since it asks of 100 incumbents to commit 
political suicide. Depending on the evolution of the political game, it 
could become an exit gambit for the current government. 
15. G. Tsebelis, Veto players: How political institutions work, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 2002, chapter 5; S. Hug - G. Tsebelis, "Veto players and référen-
dums around the world", Journal of Theoretical Politics, vol. 14, no 4, 2002, pp. 
465-515. 
16. N. Alivizatos, Ποια δημοκρατία για την Ελλάδα μετά την κρίση, Πόλις, Athens 
2013; P.I. Pararas, «Συνταγματική αναθεώρηση, τώρα», Η Καθημερινή, January 15, 
2014. http://www.kathimerini.gr/551921 /opinion/epikairothta/ politikh/syntag-
matikh-ana8ewrhsh-twra. 
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3. HOW WE CAN SHAPE THINGS UP THROUGH 
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
I showed you in the first part of my talk that it is difficult to make changes, 
and in the second that most people who want to make them are looking 
not just in the wrong place, but also in the opposite direction: they try to 
increase the number of veto players, when the only way we will get out 
of the wrong equilibrium is if we decrease them (or bring them closer 
together). Unlocking the constitution would be one step in the right 
direction, but it will not help very much if we make modifications like 
the ones discussed above (if we increase the number of veto players we 
will reach the same "locking" with different means). 
The Greek political system is in serious trouble. This is neither an 
original nor a novel assessment. The statement can generate unanimous 
consent, but does not advance our understanding of causes of the identi-
fication of necessary cures. I think we would advance our analysis if we 
focused on the party system. In each of the statements I will be making I 
may have disagreements, but I hope that by the end of the analysis I will 
have a large majority in favor of the diagnosis and the proposed cure. 
The problem with the Greek party system is that it is centrifugal. De-
spite the fact that a large majority of people desire a solution to the serious 
problems I outlined above, the party system responds in the opposite di-
rection: polarization. If we want to analyze this polarization more closely, 
we will see two features: first, that extreme parties have unusual strength 
(in the Greek case, particularly on the right), and second, that the other 
(more moderate) parties are being influenced by these extreme parties (or 
their own internal forces that feel close to these parties). So, SYRIZA is 
very concerned about its left side and New Democracy is about its right. 
Let me use one example from German policymaking borrowed from 
Der Spiegel.17 The article states that "Merkel is afraid that, for the EP 
election on May 25, the Euro-skeptic party Alternative for Germany will 
profit from a discussion about new aid for Greece" on the other hand 
Schaeuble "sees the danger that - without the prospect of new aid - radi-
17. Spiegel.de., "Streit ums Hilfspaket: Merkel blockiert Schaeubles Griechenland-
Plaene", issue 8/2014. Published online Feb. 16, 2014. http://www.spiegel.de/ 
politik/deutschland/merkel-lehnt-schaeubles-griechenland-plaene-ab-a-953738.html 
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cai parties in Greece will gain electoral support at the election." What 
is interesting to note here is that both German politicians are concerned 
about the electoral consequences not the policy consequences of their 
choices. You can recognize the phenomenon of policy impact of extrem-
ist parties although official statements will ignore such parties and offer 
different justifications. 
If we want such phenomena to change, we must do so through the 
electoral system: in a democracy, ultimately what happens is consistent 
with what the people select in elections. And an electoral system is the 
primary institution that contains incentives both for the people who elect 
and the people who get elected. Since at least 1951, with Duverger's law, 
political science has been studying electoral systems. 
I will start with one actual modification of an electoral system that 
was designed to reduce polarization and has had successful results. In 
the United States, the electoral system involves a primary election within 
each party, after which the winners of these primary elections (along 
with candidates from other parties, as determined by the electoral law of 
each state) confront each other in the final election. The candidate with a 
plurality of votes is the winner. This electoral system had produced many 
extreme candidates with the following mechanism: within each of the 
two major parties it was possible that the extremist side was more power-
ful than the centrist, so that one party selected an extremist representa-
tive in the primaries. In the final election, voters had to choose between 
two extreme candidates, which lead to a divided Congress where rep-
resentatives mainly confronted each other along party lines rather than 
compromise. In 2013, some 80 Republican Representatives sent a letter 
to the (Republican) Speaker of the House asking him to shut down the 
government rather than compromise with the President on budgetary is-
sues. The result has been successive blockings of US policymaking. Presi-
dent Obama complained because the shutdown was caused by a fraction 
of one party among the two political parties, in one of the two Houses 
in Congress, in one of the two branches of Government. This remarkably 
small subset of politicians wanted to impose its will upon all the rest. 
To address the polarization and reduce the number of extreme candi-
dates it produced, two states of the US decided to change their electoral 
system in the 2000s. The process took more than a decade to be com-
pleted, and it involved référendums and Supreme Court decisions. The 
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modification was called a "blanket primary" and it involved two steps: 
first, the primaries took place together—rather than separately by par-
ty—where voters select candidates of their choice; second, that only the 
first two candidates (regardless of party) would participate in the elec-
tion. The outcome of this modification is that if, in a constituency, two 
candidates of the same party are selected for the final confrontation, then 
the more moderate will prevail, because the voters of the other party will 
select him (along with his initial supporters). We can evaluate the success 
of this gap by examining how many of the more extreme representatives 
signing the letter to the Speaker of the House (mentioned above) come 
from these two states: only 3 were from California (the most populated 
state) and 0 were from Washington,18 In the 2014 election a tea Party 
Republican (one of the three singators of the letter to the Speaker I dis-
cussed above) is now challenged by a moderate in the blanket primary 
(for the first time ever). 
The attempts to introduce blanket primaries in Washington go back 
to the 1930s, the attempts in California led to a successful referendum in 
1996 that was rejected by the American Supreme Court. A modified blan-
ket primary was introduced in Washington and upheld by the Court, and 
California passed its own (identical) provision by referendum in 2010. 
A similar (in terms of the political effects) electoral system of alterna-
tive vote was introduced by the Liberal party in the UK in a referendum 
agreed as part of the government agreement with the Conservative par-
ty.19 The electoral system was rejected by British voters. 
The US and UK have plurality electoral systems, so, their examples are 
not applicable in Greece. A successful modification needs to change both 
the political system and mentalities: the expectations of voters and par-
ties with respect to who is selected. Secondly, the change in parties needs 
to produce candidates who are more moderate than those currently se-
lected. Greece has been an important influence in the design of electoral 
18. R. Wilson, "The solution to hyper-partisanship already exists, and it doesn't 
involve gerrymandering", October 18, 2013. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs 
/govbeat/wp/2013/ 10/18/the-solution-to-hyper-partisanship-already-exists-and-it-
doesnt-involve-gerrymandering/ 
19. BBC.com. "Vote 2011: UK rejects alternative vote", May 6, 2011, http://www. 
bbc.com/news/ uk-politics-13297573 
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systems worldwide. Let me explain first the positive features of the cur-
rent Greek system, analyse the criticisms and proposed alternations and 
then present the modifications I claim would help shape representation 
and politics in the desired dimension of discussing and problem solving. 
An electoral system is expected to satisfy two requirements: represen-
tation of the population, and government stability. Because these two re-
quirements are contradictory, as we saw in the first portion of the paper, 
different countries elect their parliament with different electoral systems 
placing different weights in these requirements: from a purely propor-
tional electoral system in Israel and the Netherlands where the whole 
country is an electoral constituency and there is no required threshold, 
leading to multiparty governments, to the plurality electoral system of 
the UK, where the Liberals never get seats proportional to their share of 
the vote and which usually produces single party governments. In this 
continuum, the electoral system of Greece has an exceptional placement, 
since it is proportional and gives small parties (over 3%) proportional 
representation, but, because of the bonus of 50 seats, was producing 
single party governments from 1981 until 2012. In the seven party par-
liament of today, a two party coalition has the majority and can form a 
stable government. 
However, people now have found different problems with the cur-
rent electoral system and several proposals have been made to try to ad-
dress special problems that manifest themselves. Some people see that 
the personal vote (the cross of preference) in large constituencies is cor-
related with corruption and therefore propose a "German" system with 
small constituencies. Others consider the 50-seat bonus to the largest 
party as promoting polarization and impoverishing the political debate. 
Still others consider the 3% threshold as eliminating interesting voices 
that should be heard in the Parliament. Several voices have been raised 
in favor of reduction of the size of Parliament. Recently, there was a 
competition between SYRIZA and DHMAR to determine who favored the 
proportional system the most, and supporters of these parties wanted to 
include a "pure" proportional representation system to the constitution in 
order to resolve the issue once and for all. 
All these criticisms (except for the last one) make valid points. The 
last one shows complete lack of understanding of politics in two funda-
mental dimensions: first, the electoral system should be satisfying two 
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constraints, not just one. Pure proportional representation would not pro­
duce stable governments (a simple proportional allocation of seats one 
the basis of votes in the 2012 election is sufficient to make this point), 
and therefore is not the eternal ideal system. As such, it should not be 
included in the constitution, unless we consider the restrictions this con­
stitution already imposes as insufficient! 
The other criticisms however, have serious factual basis, and a re­
duction of the size of large constituencies, and/or the size of the bonus 
could improve features of the current system. The most founded (and 
unquestionably beneficial) would be the reduction of the size of Parlia­
ment. However, they do not address the fundamental problems that we 
face: first that the electoral system produces very significant centrifugal 
forces, and second the need to have a government that will coordinate 
our movement away from the current (bad) equilibrium. 
There is a very simple solution that will fundamentally transform the 
electoral system, and the political system that it will generate. I have pro­
posed that every voter receives multiple votes instead of one.20 My initial 
proposal involved up to three votes, but since then Potami has emerged 
as a significant party, so, the number of votes has to be increased to up to 
four: however, it is not the number of votes that matters as much as the 
way the votes are cast. Voters can use these votes to select up to four par­
ties of their preference (cumulation, that is use of two or more votes for 
the same party is not allowed). None of the other features of the electoral 
system needs to be changed, although if a consensus about additional 
changes emerges the revised system can accommodate them. 
The simple institutional change of multiple votes has profound con­
sequences on the meaning and the effects of voting. With respect to the 
meaning, instead of the voter deciding with a single choice which party 
(s)he identifies with, the multiple choice indicates which parties have 
characteristics that the voter appreciates (their political positions, their 
ability to form coalitions, the personal qualities of their representatives). 
It possible, but not likely that one single party will satisfy a voter with 
respect to all these dimensions. So, the perspective changes, and instead 
20. G. Tsebelis, «Άποψη: Δώστε τρεις ψήφους στον λαό». October 11, 2013, 
Η Καθημερινή, http://www.kathimerini.gr/503366/article/epikairothta/politikh/ 
apoyh-dwste-treis-yhfoys-ston-lao. 
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of the voter trying to fit the best possible in the existing party system, he 
becomes the center of the act, and decides which parties express better 
his preferences and values. 
Let us now turn to the consequences. How will such a system affect 
voters, parties and government? 
Voters. Under the current system with 1 vote, each voter has the pos-
sibility of electing 1 out of 8 parties (let us ignore the smaller ones for 
now, the larger parties play such a large role that we will first focus on 
them), or abstaining, which gives him 9 choices. Under the system I pro-
pose, each voter will be able to vote for one, two, three, or four parties, 
or abstain. That will produce 163 different choices (8 single party choic-
es, 28 two party choices, 56 three party choices, 70 four party choices, 
and 1 abstention). So, each voter will have many more choices to express 
him/herself. For example, people who like the center left, will be able 
to vote for PASOK, Potami, and DHMAR, as well (if they so wish) for a 
major party; voters who want a government of national unity may vote 
for ND and SYRIZA (and maybe also PASOK, Potami, or DHMAR), people 
who want a government of ND or SYRIZA will be able to vote in favor of 
other parties too, in order to assure their ability to form a government 
coalition in (the all but certain) case of lack of 151 votes. Given that vot-
ers will have many more choices, they will pay more attention to political 
debates, trying to decide whether they will exercise their right to vote for 
four parties, or select three, two, or even one. They have an incentive to 
vote for more than one party because they can only allocate one vote per 
party and using more of their votes allows them to maximize their influ-
ence on electoral outcomes. 
Parties. The parties will adopt strategies that will maximize their 
votes. Given that they can gain votes not only from their members or 
traditional supporters but also from supporters of other parties, they will 
shift their discourse from ideological to pragmatic, and from aggressive 
to conciliatory, so that they will be able to attract the additional votes 
(under the current system a second or third-ranked party would not re-
ceive a vote, but are likely to receive a vote under the new system). In 
other words, parties will be actively focusing on centrist voters because 
voters have the possibility of rewarding four parties each. 
Party system. The party systems that will emerge will have a series of 
desirable characteristics. Centrist parties will be stronger than they cur-
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rently are because they will receive additional votes. Extremist parties 
will be less influential than under the current system. As we observed in 
Figure 2, this change will lead to greater potential for policy change and 
yield policies more reflective of the people's wishes. Centrist parties will 
emphasize solutions over ideology, and the political debate will be cen-
tered around problem solving and differences in the solutions proposed 
as opposed to matters of principle. 
Government The government will be formed by the centrist parties, 
because they will receive a majority of votes, with most agreement on 
the solutions proposed. Therefore it will be more able to coordinate the 
plan for modification of the status quo (the veto players will have smaller 
ideological distance among them and therefore will be less policy stabil-
ity as I demonstrated in Figure 2). In particular, it will make feasible a 
serious constitutional revision (not a minimal one like the upcoming). 
Moving to this new system may raise some questions, particularly 
regarding the number of votes per voter, the mechanisms behind its suc-
cess, and whether such a system has ever been 'proven' or used in prac-
tice. These are very reasonable questions and we turn to each one of them 
at a time. 
Number of votes 
In his seminal article on ideological positions generated by electoral 
systems Gary Cox proves that electoral systems with a number of parties 
more than double the number of votes per voter will produce party 
systems that are ideologically dispersed.21 Fundamental assumptions 
for Cox's argument are single peaked preferences of voters22, one-
dimensional politics, and mandatory use of the number of votes. These 
assumptions are necessary in order to prove a theorem of existence and 
uniqueness, but are more or less plausible and more or less required for 
a likely outcome. 
While these are plausible in general, they are not all equally relevant 
when we consider political systems. For example, while single peaked-
21. G.W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems", 
American Journal of Political Science, vol. 34, no. 4, November 1990, pp. 903-935. 
22. That voters can somehow rank or order their choices. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 18/05/2020 01:57:12 |
THE GREEK CONSTITUTION FROM A POLITICAL SCIENCE POINT OF VIEW 169 
ness of preferences is the most important factor driving Cox's results, it 
is also a very reasonable and realistic assumption. Another assumption, 
one dimensionality is less reasonable: there are multiple issues that are 
addressed by a party system. Not only the left-right continuum, but also 
immigration, the EU, globalization, healthcare, social security, environ-
ment, etc. Closeness in one of these dimensions does not guarantee prox-
imity in the others. Furthermore, mandatory use of all votes can indeed 
guarantee convergence of parties, but (in my opinion) is too restrictive to 
the freedom of choice of voters. Why should a voter be forced to use all 
four of his votes? 
To explore what the application of my proposal would look like and 
assure the reader that it accomplishes what I have argued, I have created 
a model of the electoral system23 where the reader can explore its proper-
ties. By allocating their vote to parties, and deciding how many additional 
votes they will use and in favor of whom (this is the most consequential 
choice), we can compare its results to those of the current system. 
Here are some of the major features: 
• Centrist voters will be more comfortable casting more votes than ex-
tremist ones (this will show up at the margin of the table, where par-
ties like PASOK, DHMAR will have voters who are more willing to vote 
for other parties). 
• Extremist voters will oscillate between voting for their own party and 
expanding towards parties more to the center (at the margin of the 
table they will be using less votes than centrist voters) 
• Centrist parties will see their percentage increased compared to the 
current system (comparison of the first and last lines of the table will 
corroborate this statement). 
The table will persuade the reader of the effectiveness of this electoral 
system to solve the current problems of the Greek party system. In addi-
tion, it will demonstrate that a higher number of votes would increase 
the centripetal forces (the reader can venture with a 3 or 4 or 5 vote 
system). However, the most interesting change cannot appear in the per-
centages of parties. It concerns the political discourse, because it will be 
23. In http://sitemaker.umich.edu/tsebelis/data the interested reader can click at 
"multiple vote electoral system". 
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Table 2: Multiple Vote Electoral System 
Number of Permitted Votes 4 
Parties: 
Election share 
under one-vote 
system (%) 
Prob of a voter 
from party GD 
voting for other 
parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party ANEL 
voting for other 
parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party ND 
voting for other 
parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party PASOK 
voting for other 
parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party 
POTAMI voting for 
other parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party 
DHMAR voting for 
other parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party SYR 
voting for other 
parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party KKE 
voting for other 
parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party I voting 
for other parties 
Prob of a voter 
from party} voting 
for other parties 
Percentage (%) 
GD 
7 
1 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
ANEL 
6 
0.2 
1 
0.3 
0 
0 
0 
0.2 
0 
10 
ND 
30 
0.4 
0.4 
1 
0.8 
0.6 
0.7 
0 
0 
21 
PASOK 
8 
0 
0 
0.7 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0 
0 
17 
POTAMI 
10 
0 
0 
0.5 
0.8 
1 
0.8 
0 
0 
14 
DHMAR 
2 
0 
0 
0.3 
0.6 
0.7 
1 
0.2 
0 
12 
SYR 
30 
0 
0.3 
0 
0.2 
0 
0.3 
1 
0.2 
15 
KKE 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.2 
1 
6 
I 
0 
0 
J 
0 
0 
TOTAL 
100 
1.6 
1.9 
2.9 
3.4 
3.2 
3.6 
1.6 
1.2 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
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the most problem solving oriented parties with civil discourse that will 
be receiving the most votes. 
The system is effective because it has two different effects: one me-
chanical and the other strategic. The mechanical effect is that because of 
single peakedness of the voters' preferences, centrist parties get higher 
representation than in the current one vote system. The strategic effect is 
that the leaders of the parties, knowing the mechanical effect will result 
in more centrist votes, will themselves move toward the center and away 
from ideologies. This is because the center holds the largest reservoir of 
multiple votes. To obtain some of these votes, party leaders will need 
to focus on problem solving instead of confrontational and ideological 
statements that will appeal to a smaller number of voters. 
One very reasonable strategic objection is that this proliferation of 
voter's choices will lead to proliferation of parties. What if Golden Dawn 
splits in four parties so that its supporters will vote for all four of them 
and exhaust their four votes when say some of PASOK supporters will not 
use all four of their votes because they do not want to vote for DHMAR 
(or vice versa)? Such behavior would inflate the votes of Golden Dawn. 
The possibility of party proliferation can be dealt with a series of auxilia-
ry measures, like the absence of financing for new parties until after they 
reach some percentage in the election, necessary number of signatures for 
creation of a party (like in Italy), and prohibition the creation of new par-
ties six months before an election. This particular deadline is necessary 
because the number of votes should be at least half the number of parties. 
Although it may be tempting to enshrine this solution by lock-
ing it constitutionally, doing so would limit adjustments down the road. 
The current system is designed to solve today's problems: how to reduce 
the weight and pressure from extremist parties, how to facilitate coali-
tions among centrist parties; how to make these parties focus on problem 
solving instead of position taking. I expect that we will be facing prob-
lems like immigration, globalization, social security, health care for many 
more years to come. Each one of these problems is dependent on values 
that we hold dear: equality, justice, efficiency. Some of them affect inter-
generational transfers and tradeoffs. A democratic debate on these issues 
has not happened not only in Greece but in any advanced industrialized 
country. It is long overdue, and we have to welcome and facilitate these 
upcoming debates. 
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On the other hand, this electoral system may not help alternation of 
different parties in power. If this happens, the political system becomes 
corrupt like the political systems of Italy and Japan in the past. If signs of 
government coalition stability and corruption emerge, we should be able 
modify the electoral law and not be prevented by the constitution. 
The system I propose is a mixture of multiple vote with proportional 
representation. Multiple vote has been used with plurality electoral sys­
tems (approval voting, and transferable vote to a certain extent), but 
never with proportional representation. Approval voting has been the 
most stable electoral system in the history of our country (1864-1920). 
It was imported from Eptanisa, which got it from the Venetian Empire. 
Actually, the Doges of Venice were elected by this system, and during the 
Middle Ages this is how the Catholic Church elected its Popes.24 If we go 
further back in time, we can find a more generic form of voting called 
"range" voting where voters can give to candidates a grade instead of a 
binary "approve", "disapprove". We can find this "range" electoral system 
in the Olympic Games today (in composite evaluations like skating on 
ice, or diving), and its origins are in the voice voting (διά βοής) of ancient 
Sparta. So, while the components of the system I propose have been used 
in the past (some of them going back to older or even ancient Greece), 
this particular combination has never been used. But then again, neither 
have the problems we're facing been so profound and the need for solu­
tions so urgent. 
In conclusion, I discussed in the first two parts that we should enable 
ourselves to decide both in terms of what is included in the constitution 
and in terms of the things that should not make their way into it. And 
I suggested a way of voting (collectively deciding) which will make our 
life easier in the tough times we're going through now, and are likely to 
come in the foreseeable future. I hope that I did these things thoroughly 
and scientifically: επισταμένως. 
24. J. Colomer - 1 . McLean, "Electing popes: approval balloting and qualified-
majority rule", Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol 29, no 1, 1998, pp.1-22. 
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